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MOTION TO GRANT REHEARING 
Come now Paul D. Nielson and the Industrial 
Commission of Utah, Defendants, and the Utah AFL-
CIO, a labor federation, amicus curiae, and petition 
this court to grant a rehearing in the above entitled 
matter, upon the grounds that this court erred as a 
matter of law, in reversing the award of the Indus-
trial Commission: 
1. In failing to give proper interpretation and ap-
plication to Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-65 
(1966); 
2. In failing to give proper interpretation and ap-
plication to Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-65 
(1966); 
3. In failing to give proper interpretation and ap-
plication to Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 
(1966);. 
4. In failing to give proper interpretation and ap-
plication to Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-79 
(1966); 
5. In holding that defendant Nielson established 
both date of injury and the date of disability as 
the same, and in basing this decision in part on 
a matter of such minor import. 
WHEREFORE, these parties respectfully move 
this court to grant this motion for rehearing and per-
mit further oral arguments and enter its order and 
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decision affirming the award of the Industrial Com-
mission below. ,,. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
... ·., . , ·. .~, · ; Attorneys.-General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Defendant 
Industrial Commission 
of Utah 
A. W. SANDACK 
Attorney for Amicus Curiae 
UTAH STATE AFL-CIO 
. 606 El Paso Natural Gas 
Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts are as stated in th~ court's opinion 
with the following additions: 
It does not appear in the court's decision that 
Nielson, following his injury of September 16, 1952, 
did in fact file a tim~ly application ~ith the Indus-
trial Commission ·of Utah. This original claim, filed 
with the Comm.ission on the 20th day of June, 1953, 
gave the commission full, plenary' and continuing 
jurisdiction of his claim (R-5). 
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On July 13, 1966, {R-91) the Commission ordered 
the employer to pay Nielson two awards: 
1. Permanent partial compensation. for a 10% 
functional loss to the right arm, and a 12% functional 
loss to the left arm, amounting to $30.25 per week 
for 24 weeksi a total of $7?,4.00. 
2. Temporary total compensation from April 
12, 1965, to and including December 1, 1965, at $30.25 
per week for a.total of $1,01] .21. 
The panel held the arm disabilities were directly 
related to. the surgical knee procedure {R-91), and 
the award was in addition to the 30% previously 
paid Nielson for the permanent partial loss to his 
lower left extremeties. 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN MISAPPLYING AND MIS-
INTERPRETING UTAH CODE ANN.§ 35-1-66 (1966). 
·A careful reading of the partial disability statute 
demonstrates that the legislature was actually cre-
ating two remedies for partially disabled workers. 
The first, provides for compensation for injuries 
to earning power. The first three paragraphs of this 
section, Utah Code Ann.§ 35-1-66 (1966), provides: 
"Where the injury causes partial disability for 
work, the employee shall receive, during such dis-
ability and for a period of not to exceed six years 
from the date of the injury, a weekly compensation 
equal to sixty per cent of the difference between his 
average weekly wages before the accident and the 
weekly wages he is able to earn thereafter, but not 
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more than $42 per week, and in addition thereto 
$3.60 for a dependent wife and $3.60 for each de-
pendent minor child under the age of eighteen years, 
up to and including four, or a maximum of $60 per 
week in the case of a dependent wife and four or 
more such dependent minor children. (Emphasis 
added.) 
In case the partial disability begins after a 
period of total disability, the period of total dis-
ability shall be deducted from the total period of 
compensation. 
In no case shall the weekly payments continue 
after the disability ends, or the death of the injured 
person." 
The compensation for this facet of the statuts 
is limited to a period of "six years from the date of 
injury" (See discussion infra). 
Following the first three paragraphs, the legis-
lature next carefully provided a schedule of com-
pensation awards for partially disabling functional 
body loss, not earning power: 
One arm at or near shoulder -------------·------
One arm at elbow___ _ ________________________ _ 
One arm between the writ and the elbow 
One hand ----··-----------·-----·--___________________ _ 
One thumb and the metacarpal bone 
thereof __ ·----··-·--· ____________________________ _ 
One thumb at the proximal joint ________ _ 
One thumb at the sP-cond distal joint __ _ 
One first finger and the- metacarpal 
bone thereof --~ _, _______________________ _ 
One first finger at the proximal joint ___ _ 
One first finger at the second joint _____ _ 
One first finger at the distal joint __ 
One second finp;er and the metacarpal 
bone thereof _____ ·-···-- __ ,___ ··-·--·-----
200 weeks 
180 weeks 
160 weeks 
150 weeks 
60 weeks 
30 weeks 
20 weeks 
30 weeks 
20 weeks 
15 weeks 
10 weeks 
·30 weeks 
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One second finger at the proximal joint 
One second finger at the second joint ___ _ 
One second finger at the distal joint . ___ _ 
One third finger and the metacarpal 
15 weeks 
10 weeks 
5 weeks 
bone thereof _______________________ .... _______ 20 weeks 
12 weeks 
8 weeks 
4 weeks 
One third finger at the proximal joint __ 
One third finger at the second joint ______ _ 
One third finger at the distal joint _______ _ 
One fourth finger anrl metacarpal 
bone thereof ___ __ _ ____________________ _ 
One fourth finger at the proximal joint 
One fourth finger at the second joint __ _ 
One fourth finger at the distal joint ___ _ 
One leg at or near the hip joint as to pre-
12 weeks 
9 weeks 
6 weeks 
3 weeks 
clude the use of an artificial limb ____ 180 weeks 
One leg at or above the knee where stump 
remains sufficient to permit the use of 
an artificial limb _________ . _______________ 150 weeks 
weeks 
weeks 
One leg between the knee and ankle ____ 140 
One foot at the ankle _____________________________ 125 
One great toe with the metatarsal 
bone thereof _____________________________ _ 
One great toe at the proximal joint _______ _ 
One great toe at the second joint _______ _ 
One toe other than the great toe with the 
30 weeks 
15 weeks 
10 weeks 
metatarsal bone thereof _____ __ _____ _____ 12 weeks 
One toe other than the great toe at the 
proximal joint _________________________________ _ 
One toe other than the great toe at the 
distal joint __________________________________ _ 
In the above cases permanent and 
complete loss of use shall be deemed 
equivalent to loss of the member or 
part thereof. 
6 weeks 
:i weeks 
One eye by enucleation _______________________ 120 weeks 
Total blindness of one eye _________________ 120 weeks 
It is clear from these paragraphs of the section 
that compensation for these functional losses not to 
exceed in any case 200 weeks, was subject only to 
the limitation as to the maximum weekly amount 
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payable in the section, or in no event to exceed $12,-
000.00. 
This remedy is not conditioned upon any limi-
tation of time. from the date of injury, so long as the 
applicant has filed a timely claim under the general 
statute of limitation; to-wit, three years. 
Nielson was awarded $724.00 permanent par-
tial disability compensation under this remedy, for 
functional loss to the body, not for any partial loss 
to his earning power. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN 
MISAPPLYING AND MISINTERPRETING UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 35-1-65 (1966). 
Nielson also received a temporary total dis-
ability award of $1,011.21 lost weekly compensation 
from April 12, 1965, to and including December 1, 
1965 at $30.25 per week. 
It will be argued that this position of the award 
is limited by the six year provision contained in Utah 
Code Ann. § 35-1-65 (1953). We respectfully submit 
that review of the history of workmen's compensa-
tion legislation will demonstrate that such argument 
is untenable. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-64 (1966) provides: 
"No compensation shall be allowed for the first 
three days after the injury is received ... provided, 
however, if the period of total temporary disability 
lasts more than 21 days, compensation shall also 
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be payable for the first three days after the injury 
is received." 
This waiting period applies to all sections of the 
workmen's compensation act. 
In 1917, Revised Statutes of Utah § 3136 read: 
"No compensation shall be allowed for the first 10 
days after the injury is received ... " 
This was amended in Revised Stat. § 42-1-60 
(1933): 
"No compensation shall be allowed for the first 
three days after the injury is received ... " 
This provision is a limitation on all compensation 
awards. Although Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-64 applies 
to all compensation, the temporary total disability 
statute (35-1-65) has never expressly incorporated 
this limitation. In order to interpret the temporary 
total disability statute, it will be necessary to inter-
pret the partial disability (35-1-66) statute. 
Section 3138 of the Revised Statutes of Utah 
(1917) provided: 
"In no case shall compensation continue for more 
than six years beginning on the 11th day of dis-
ability ... " 
The comparable 1933 section reads: 
"In no case shall compensation continue for more 
than six years beginning on the 4th day of disabil-
ity . . ." 
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Finally, Laws of Utah 1939 Ch. 51 1 provided: 
" ... six years from the date of injury ... " 
This language has been retained in present law, 
Utah Code Ann.§ 35-1-66 (1966). 
By reducing the waiting period from the 11th 
day of disability. to the 4th day of disability, to the 
date of injury, the legislature actually intended dat'3 
of injury to mean the 1st day of disability. 
This interpretation is supported by long pre-
cedent in the court. In Salt Lake City v. Industrial 
Commission, 93 Utah 510, 74 P.2d 657 (1937), this 
court held: 
"Not until there is an accident and injury and a 
disability or loss from the injury does the duty to pay 
arise. A mere accident does not impose the duty to 
pay. Accident plus injury therefrom does not im-
pose the duty. But accident plus injury which re-
sults in disability or loss gives rise to the duty to 
pay. When the employer refuses or ceases to pay 
compensation, the cause of action against him 
arises." 
In Wiliams v. Industrial Commission, 95 Utah 
376, 81 P.2d 649 (1937), the court held: 
"In our recent decision in the case of Salt Lake 
City v. Industrial Commission, 74 P.2d 657, we held, 
overruling the previous cases, that the limitation 
period does not be;:;in to run until a disability has 
arisen resulting from accidental injury in the course 
of employment. We there held that the limitation 
statute in industrial accident cases (page 658), 
* * * begins to run, not from the time of the 
accident, but from the time of the employer's failure 
to pay compensation for disability when the dis-
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ability can be ascertain~d and the duty to pay com-
pensation arises. * * *" 
In State Industrial Fund v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 116 Utah 279, 209 P.2d 558 (1949), the court held 
in an occupational disease case: 
"This question is one of first impression in this 
court under this statute, hut in Salt Lake City v. 
Industrial Commission, 93 Utah 510, 74 P.2d 657, 
we passed on a somewhat similar question. There 
we were dealing with the general statute of limita-
tions as applied to the filing of a claim for workmen's 
compensation. In that case the applicant in the 
course of his employment by Salt Lake City was, on 
,June 26, 1928, struck in his eye by a golf baJI and 
thereby disabled for a short period of time for which 
he was paid compensation without filing a claim 
therefore. In January, 1936, this eye began to give 
him trouble again, and later his doctors advised him 
that he was P-·oing to lose the sight in his eye as the 
result of the injury thereto in 1929 and on May 13, 
1936, he filed his claim for compensation for such 
loss. In holdinq that the claim was filed in time we 
said on pa!!es 512-514 of 93 Utah Reports on page 
658 of 74 P.2d; 
* * * We think Section 104-2-26 R.S. Utah 
1933, * * * was applicable as a statute of limitations, 
but that it begins to run, not from the time of the 
accident, but from the time of the employer's failure 
to pay compensation for disability when the disabil-
ity can be ascertained and the duty to pay com-
pensation arises. * * * The Compensation Act 
* * * imposes a duty on employers to pay compensa-
tion to employees who suffer disability from an in-
jury by accident arising out of or in the course of 
the employment. Not until there is an accident and 
injury and disability or loss from the injury does the 
duty to pay arise. A mere accident does not imnose 
the duty to pay. Accident plus injury therefrom does 
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not impose the duty. But accident plus in.jury which 
results in disability or loss gives rise to the duty to 
pay. When the employer refuses or ceases to pay 
compensation, the cause of action against him 
arises." 
And Justice Wolf concurring in the result wrote: 
"It appears to me that in this sort of case the 
reasoning in the case of Salt Lake City v. Industrial 
Commission, 93 Utah 510, 74 P.2d 657, is applicable. 
The employer's liability is imposed by statute; the 
carrier's liability by contract made pursuant to the 
statute for the benefit of any person disabled under 
the terms of the statute. It follows, therefore, that 
the conditions antecedent to the accrua of a cause of 
action are; ( 1) A compensable disability under the 
terms of the statute. (2) Reasonable diligence in 
the ascertainment of the extent and nature of the 
disability and the fact that it was employment 
caused. (3) Knowledge of such compensable disa-
bility brought home to the responsible employer 
which is notice to the carrier. ( 4) Refusal or failure 
of the responsible employer (viz. his insurance car-
rier) to meet the obligation to pay compensation 
within a reasonable time. The cause of action that 
is the cause for the action against the carrier is under 
the act, the failure or refusal of the responsible car-
rier to meet its contractual obligation which does 
not arise until all three of the previous conditions 
are or can be fulfilled." 
It has also been held that injury means com-
pensable injury or disabling injury and is synono-
mous with compensable disability. Hoschek v. Vol-
can Iron Co., 157 Pa. Super. 227, 32 A.2d 280 (1945). 
See Mollerup Van Lines v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 16 Utah 2d 235, 298, P.2d 882 (1965); and Spen-
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cer v. Industrial Commission. 4 Utah 2d 185, 290 P.2d 
692 (1955). 
We respectfully submit that the phrase date of 
injury means first day of disability. according to 
"casualty," not calendar years, as held in Hardy v. 
Industrial Commission. 89 Utah 561, 58 P.2d 15 (1936) 
and Utah Apex Mining Co. v. Industrial Commission, 
116 Utah 305, 209 P.2d 571 (1949). 
In Hardy this court held: 
"The limitation provided by the section (permanent 
partial disability relates to the disability period and 
not the calendar period dating from the injury." 
Therefore, a claimant could receive a maximum 
of 312 weeks of disability payments within 6 cas-
ualty years. 
When Hardy was decided, the partial disability 
section provided for compensation not to exceed 
six years from the 4th day of disability. If we equate 
"date of injury" with first day of disability," then 
Hardy remains pertinent. 
After the 1939 amendment to the partial dis-
ability section, Utah Apex Mining Co. v. Industrial 
Commission came before the court. That case prop-
erly held the commission retained jurisdiction. 
Where injuries were sustained in 1931 and ag-
gravation resulted in 1948, the court observed in 
Apex: 
"Inasmuch as this is the only provision in either 
statute with which we are here concerned, the reas-
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oning of this court in that case is applicable here. 
We there held that the provision the.t payment of 
compensation should not continue for more than six 
years from the date of the injury was only meant 
to fix the period during which payment is to extend, 
that is, the disability period, and that it was not in 
conflict with 42-1-72, supra, which provides that the 
jurisdiction of the Commission shall be continuing. 
We there said: 
"We discover no conflict betwen section 42-1-62 
and section 42-1-72, supra. The latter section is one 
relating to jurisdiction only. The former relates to 
the amount to be paid and the period during which 
the payment shall extend. 'Where the injury causes 
partial disability for work, the employee shall re-
ceive during such disability and for a period of not 
to exceed six years' the compensation provided for 
by the statute. Reading the whole section, it is ap-
parent the part under consideration and last above 
quoted has the same effect and meaning as though 
it read: 'When the injury causes partial disability 
for work the employee shall receive, during such dis-
ability * * * not to exceed six years, the compensa-
tion specified'. 
"The limitation provided by the section relates 
to the disability period and not the calendar period 
dating from the injury. 
We conclude that the Commission properly per-
mitted a hearing and was empowered to make an 
additional award of compensation should it be made 
to appear that such an award was proper." 
The court observed in Apex, that section 42-1-6 i 
and 62 R.S.U. 1933 (35-1-65 and 35-1-66): 
" ... are, in substance, identical when we limit our 
consideration to the provision that payment of com-
pensation shall not continue for more than six 
years from the date of injury." 
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Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that both 
Hardy and Utah Apex Mining are controlling, unless 
by this Nielson decision, the court overrules thes·3 
pecedents. 
POINT III 
THE EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY UNDER THE 
WORKMEN'S C01\1PENSATION LAW IS DEFINITE 
AND CERTAIN UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-67 
( 1966). 
The court's concern that: 
"The three and six year statutes are ones of repose, 
which we think the legislature intended should ter-
minate, not encourage protraction of claims, otlier-
wise, an employer could and would be an insurer for 
the natUral lives of its employees, based on real or 
imaginary discoveries of erstwhile latent in-
juries .... " 
is relieved by the last paragraph of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 35-1-67 (1966), which clea.rly provides that: 
"In no case shall the employer be required to pay 
compensation for any combination of disabilities 
of any kind including loss of function, in excess of 
$18,720." 
Once this figure is reached, any combination 
of disabilities such· as temporary total. temporary 
partial. permanent partial, or permanent total are 
subject to this overall monetary limitation. 
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POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER -OF LAW IN 
MISAPPLYING AND MISiNTERPRETING UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 35-1-78 (1966). 
The statute of limitation applicable to all work-
men's compensation fow is provided in Utah Code 
Ann. § 35-1-99 Cl 966). 
It has been held in Spencer v. Industrial Com-
mission, supra p. 645: 
"In view of the express term of this statute of limi- _ 
tation, there can be no doubt that once the appli-
cation has been filed, and the commission's jurisdic-
tion invoked it has the authority to entertain 
further proceedings to deal with any substantial 
changes or unexpected developments that may arise 
as a result of the injury. 
There was no error committed, in fact, the 
commission was obliged to take jurisdiction and 
consider the new application." 
Utah Code Ann.§ 35-1-78 provides: 
. "The power and jurisdiction of commission over 
each case shall be continuing, and it may from time 
to time make such modification or change with re-
spect to former finding, or orders with respect there-
to as in its opinion may be justified ... " 
If, as the court holds in Nielson, the jurisdic-
tion is continuing only for six years subsequent to 
the date of injury, then there would be no reason 
for the provision: 
" ... that records pertaining to cases, other than 
those of total permanent disability, or where a claim 
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has been filed as .in 35-1~99, which has been closed 
and inactive for a period of 10 years, may be de-
stroyed at the discretion of the commission. (Utah 
Code Ann. § 35-1-78)." 
The legislature obviously contemplated that ag-
gravated disability should be compensated, even 
though it occurred more than six years after the in-
jury, provided proper appliation was made, and 
findings supported the modification. See exhaustive 
review of Utah cases in 165 A.LR. at 108 and 116, 
and see the excellent article in Vol. 33-34 University 
of Missouri, Kansas City Law Review, P.125 (1965). 
A petition for modification is not a new proceed-
ing. It is merely another step in the proceeding 
which was initiated by the original application for 
a claim. Parker v. Industrial Commission. 66 Utah 
256, 241 Pac. 362 (1925); Utah Apex Mining Co. v. In· 
dustrial Commission. 77 Utah 542, 298 Pac. 381 (1931). 
Furthermore, where statutes provide review at 
"any time," or from "time to time," review is not 
barred at a later time by the expiration of the time 
period for which compensation was originally 
awarded and paid. Moray v. Industrial Commission. 
58 Utah 404, 199 Pac. 1023 (1921); Utah Apex Mining 
Co., supra. 
It is respectfully submitted that the court erron-
eously construed Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-78 (1966) as 
a limitation on the commission's continuing juris-
diction. 
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POINT V · 
THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN 
HOLDING THAT THE LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT EX-
HAUSTS A CLAIMANT'S PERIOD OF COMPENSATION 
UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-99 (1966). 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-79 authorizes the commis-
sio to commute periodical benefits into one lump 
sum payment. It was stated in Barber Asphalt Corp. 
v. Industrial Commission, 102 Utah 371, 135 P.2d 
266 (1943): 
"That provision does not purport to authorize the 
commission to approve a lump sum settlement so 
as to bar a claim for additional compensation for a 
disability out of the injury which was not known, or 
existing at the time of the payment. It connotes a 
lump sum payment in lieu of installment payments 
then awarded or owing under the statute for a dis-
ability then known. (135 P.2d at 271)." 
It was further held in Utah Fuel Co. v. Industrial 
Commission, 159 P.2d 877 (1945): 
"Under the Workmen's Compensation Act, the In-
dustrial Commission has continuing jurisdiction to 
grant additional awards even though payment has 
been made to an injured employee under an agree-
ment for final settlement, with the approval of the 
commission, if after the settlement there is a change 
in the condition of the employee." 
Nielson did receive an order from the Industrial 
Commission authorizing his lump sum payment (R-
22). Therefore, the court erred when it held that the 
lump sum settlement exhausted Nielson's compen-
sation. 
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POINT VI 
THE COURT ERRED WHEN I'T HELD THAT NIEL-
SON HAD SELECTED IN HIS APPLICATION THE 
DATE OF INJURY AND 'THE DATE OF DISABILITY 
AS THE SAME. 
The date of the original injury, September 16, 
1952, and the date of the greater disability, April 11, 
1965, were both clearlv alleged on Nielson's applica-
tion for additional compensation (R-25). In basing 
its decision that Nielson, "in his own application 
set both the date of injury and disability at the same 
time, so that really there is no problem as to dates 
of accident, disability, or discovery," the court mis-
read the record and worked an unconscienable in-
justice to the applicant cmd to the cause of the statute 
by its oversimplification of an insignificant point at 
issue. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, we respectfully urge the 
court to grant this petition for rehearing and, after 
oral argument and due consideration, affirm the 
decision of the Industrial Commission. 
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